Abstract. In this paper we consider anonymity in the context of Broadcast Encryption (BE). This issue has received very little attention so far and all but one of the currently available BE schemes fail to provide anonymity. Yet, we argue that it is intrinsically desirable to provide anonymity in standard applications of BE and that it can be achieved at a moderate cost. We provide a security definition for Anonymous Broadcast Encryption (ANOBE) and show that it is achievable assuming only the existence of IND-CCA secure public key encryption (PKE). Focusing on reducing the size of ciphertexts, we then give two generic constructions for ANOBE. The first is from any anonymous (key-private) IND-CCA secure PKE scheme, and the second is from any IBE scheme that satisfies a weak security notion in the multi-TA setting. Furthermore, we show how randomness re-use techniques can be deployed in the ANOBE context to reduce computational and communication costs, and how a new cryptographic primitive -anonymous hint systems -can be used to speed up the decryption process in our ANOBE constructions. Finally, we present a slightly modified version of the Kurosawa-Desmedt (KD) PKE scheme (establishing several results about this scheme that may be of independent interest) and use it to instantiate our first main construction, yielding the currently most efficient ANOBE scheme. All of our results are in the standard model, achieving fully collusion-resistant ANOBE schemes secure against adaptive IND-CCA adversaries.
Introduction
Anonymity. In a world that is increasingly relying on digital technologies, addressing the issue of protecting users' privacy is of crucial importance. This is reflected by the great attention given to anonymity in all the main fields of modern cryptography. In the area of Public-Key Encryption (PKE), anonymity is often referred to as key-privacy [6] . This notion captures the property that an eavesdropper is not able to tell under which one of several public keys a ciphertext was created. The analogous concept in the ID-based setting was studied in [1, 13] . The benefit of preserving receivers' privacy is relevant in more elaborate systems involving for example Hierarchical IBE [12] , Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) or Predicate Encryption [31] , where achieving anonymity guarantees becomes increasingly challenging. Furthermore, in the context of digital signatures, a number of primitives effectively rely on anonymity -group signatures [18] , anonymous credentials [17] and e-cash [16] are well-known examples of this.
Broadcast Encryption. Broadcast Encryption (BE) addresses the issue of confidentially broadcasting a message to an arbitrary subset drawn from a universe of users. We will call the universe of n users U and the target, or privileged, set S, where S ⊆ U . Since its introduction in 1993 by Fiat and Naor [25] , various flavours of BE have been introduced: the scheme can be in a symmetric or asymmetric setting; the set of receivers could be static or dynamic; revocation and traitor-tracing algorithms could be integrated into the system, users' keys might or might not be updated and then forward secrecy may be achieved. We refer to some of the relevant work in the area and the references therein [25, 38, 22, 45, 9, 20, 19, 29] . One of the fundamental properties of a BE scheme is collusion resistance in the sense that no coalition of users in U \ S should be able to recover the message. In the literature we can find several schemes that resist collusion attacks mounted by coalitions of at most t < n users; only some schemes are fully collusion-resistant, i.e. they can tolerate attacks by coalitions of any size. For the purpose of this paper, we will consider systems that are public-key, allow stateless receivers (users that are not required to update their private keys) and are fully collusion-resistant. These are by now standard objectives for a BE scheme in the public-key setting.
Several additional practical aspects need to be taken into consideration, especially in view of the real-life applications of BE: strength of security notions, public and private storage requirements, ciphertext length, and computational costs. The specific nature of the primitive has led researchers to focus in particular on solutions having ciphertexts that are as short as possible. In this respect, the results of [9] and [29] are nearly optimal. However, designing BE schemes for real-life applications to broadcasting should not only involve efficiency and confidentiality issues. In particular, the privacy of users should be protected as much as possible. We believe that, to date, this aspect has not been adequately dealt with. Our study of the literature reveals that anonymity in BE has only been considered in a single paper [5] , in the context of encrypted file systems 3 . Surprisingly, almost all subsequent work on BE has ignored the issue of anonymity. Moreover, as we shall explain below, state-of-the-art BE schemes are inherently incapable of providing any kind of anonymity.
Anonymity in Broadcast Encryption. According to commonly accepted definitions [29, 10, 19 ], a BE scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Enc and Dec. Each user in the system can obtain his private key from the KeyGen algorithm, and the sender can choose an arbitrary target set of users S to which he wishes to broadcast a message. To decrypt, a legitimate user, i.e. a user in S, has to run the decryption algorithm on input the ciphertext, his private key and a description of the target set S. This set S is required specifically as an input to Dec in the existing definitions of BE. Hence the user needs to somehow know to which set S the message was broadcast, otherwise he cannot decrypt. Unfortunately, solving this problem is not just a matter of removing this requirement from the model, as current schemes explicitly rely on S as an input to Dec for decryption to work. Thus these schemes cannot provide any anonymity.
This limitation in the existing BE model and schemes clearly causes serious privacy issues: imagine we deploy a BE scheme, as defined above, for television broadcasting. Suppose the privileged set is the set of all users who have paid a subscription to a certain channel. Each customer should have access to that channel using his private key. The problem is that, to decrypt, he will have to know who else has paid for the specific subscription! Not only is this requirement very inconvenient for the practical deployment of BE schemes, it is also a severe violation of the individual subscriber's privacy. Ideally, a BE scheme should protect users' privacy by guaranteeing that ciphertexts do not leak any information about the privileged set S.
Current BE schemes such as those in [29, 10, 19] do not account for the cost of broadcasting a description of S when calculating the size of ciphertexts. In the most general usage scenario intended for BE, where S is dynamic and may be unpredictable from message to message, the ciphertexts in such schemes must effectively include a description of S as part of the ciphertexts themselves.
This means that the true ciphertext size in these schemes is linear in n rather than constant-size, as a cursory examination of the schemes might suggest 4 . However, achieving linear-sized ciphertext is already an impressive achievement, since there is a simple counting argument showing that, for a universe of n users in which every possible subset S should be reachable by secure broadcast, ciphertexts must contain at least n bits.
Further Details on Related Work. As mentioned above, the only prior work addressing the issue of anonymity in BE appears to be that of Barth et al. [5] (there, it is called privacy). In [5] , several BE systems used in practice were examined with respect to anonymity. In addition, a generic construction for a BE scheme using a key-private, IND-CCA secure PKE scheme was given, with the scheme achieving anonymity and IND-CCA security against static adversaries. The construction encrypts the message for each intended receiver using the PKE scheme, and then ties together the resulting ciphertexts using a strongly secure one-time signature. Barth et al. [5] also provided a technique which can be used to speed-up decryption, but this technique was only analysed in the Random Oracle Model. In [11] the authors provide a private linear broadcast encryption (PLBE) scheme to realise a fully collusion-resistant traitor-tracing scheme. A PLBE, however, is a BE system with limited capabilities (i.e. it cannot address arbitrary sets of users) and hence this work does not provide a solution to the problem considered so far.
In a very recent work [24] that builds on [5] and this paper, the authors have given constructions for anonymous broadcast encryption schemes with compact ciphertexts, but using a much weaker notion of anonymity that does not seem to relate very closely to real-world requirements.
There is much work, both cryptographic and non-cryptographic, on pseudonymous systems. In principle, pseudonyms could be used to enhance the anonymity of BE schemes: now users would not be identifiable directly, since a certificate would link a public key to a pseudonym rather than a real name. However, ciphertexts would still be linkable, in the sense that it would be possible to detect if two ciphertexts were intended for the same set of recipients or not. The approach we take here offers much stronger levels of privacy, removing ciphertext linkability in particular.
Our Contributions. Despite its importance, anonymous broadcast encryption has not received much attention since the initial work of Barth et al. [5] . This paper aims to raise the profile of this neglected primitive.
We start by giving a unified security definition for Anonymous Broadcast Encryption (ANOBE). Instead of separating anonymity and confidentiality as in [5] , we use a combined security notion for ANOBE which helps to streamline our presentation and proofs. In addition, we strengthen the model to allow the adversary to make adaptive corruptions, with all of our constructions achieving security in this setting. In contrast, the definition of [5] is static, requiring the adversary to choose whom to corrupt before seeing the public keys in the system. As a first step we show that our enhanced security definition is indeed satisfiable: adaptively secure ANOBE can be built based only on the existence of IND-CCA secure PKE (without requiring the base PKE scheme to have any anonymity properties itself). This construction results in a very efficient (constant) decryption procedure but has ciphertexts whose size is linear in n, the number of users in the universe U .
Our second contribution is to show that the generic construction for ANOBE suggested by Barth et al. [5] actually possesses adaptive security, and not merely static security as was established in [5] . This construction starts from any weakly robust (in the sense of [2] ), key-private PKE scheme with chosen-ciphertext security. In comparison with our first generic construction, this result imposes stronger requirements on the underlying encryption scheme. However, it achieves shorter ciphertexts, with the size being linear in the size of the target set S. We also provide a variant of this construction that replaces the IND-CCA secure PKE component with an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme having suitable security properties. This alternative further increases the set of components that can be used to obtain ANOBE.
One major drawback of the latter constructions is that decryption takes linear time in the size of the set S. Our third result is a technique allowing for constant decryption cost and which we prove secure in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles) using our enhanced security definition. So far, the only known technique -put forth by Barth et al. [5] -enabling constant-time decryption requires the random oracle heuristic in the security analysis. To eliminate the random oracle, we introduce a new primitive, which we call an anonymous hint system. In essence, this primitive provides a way for an encrypter to securely tell receivers which ciphertext component is intended for them, allowing them to ignore all but one ciphertext component and so decrypt more efficiently. The hint primitive, for which we provide an implementation based on the Decision-DiffieHellman (DDH) assumption, is defined and realized in such a way that its integration with our generic ANOBE constructions maintains compatibility with our proofs of adaptive security.
Our fourth contribution is to show how randomness re-use techniques originally developed for PKE in [34, 8, 7] can be modified for secure deployment in the ANOBE setting. In particular, we identify a slightly stronger notion of reproducibility that we call key-less reproducibility. We show that if our base PKE scheme has this property (in addition to the other properties needed in our generic construction) then it can be used with the same randomness across all ciphertext components in our main ANOBE construction. This not only allows the size of ciphertexts to be reduced further (by eliminating repeated ciphertext elements) but also reduces the sender's computational overhead.
Our final contribution is to establish that the Kurosawa-Desmedt (KD) [36] hybrid encryption scheme can be tweaked to have all the properties that are needed of the base PKE scheme in our constructions. The KD scheme is an ideal starting point since it is one of most efficient PKE schemes with IND-CCA security in the standard model. In results that may be of independent interest, we present KD * , a modified version of the KD scheme, that is strongly robust (although weak robustness suffices for our purposes), assuming that its symmetric components satisfy some relatively mild conditions; anonymous under the DDH assumption (and, again, under mild assumptions on its symmetric components) and key-less reproducible.
Tying everything together and using KD * as the base scheme, we obtain the currently most efficient instantiation of an ANOBE scheme, for which ciphertexts contain only 2 group elements and |S| symmetric ciphertexts (plus a signature and a verification key). Decryption can be achieved in constant time by combining this scheme with our DDH-based hint system, with an additional 2|S| + 1 group elements in the ciphertext.
As can be seen from the details of our constructions, achieving anonymity does not add any cost to the encryption process compared to non-anonymous schemes (for example, [9, 29] ): in our ANOBE schemes, encryption requires a number of group operations that is linear in |S|. As for decryption, our speed-up technique allows the legitimate user to recover the message in constant time. Our ciphertext size is linear in |S| (and thus linear in n and of the same order of magnitude as the true ciphertext size in existing BE schemes). Thus one interpretation of our results is that anonymity does not "cost" anything in an asymptotic sense. Naturally, the constants matter in practice, and reducing the constant in the ciphertext size for ANOBE to something closer to what can be achieved in the non-anonymous setting is a major open problem. However, we reiterate that reducing the true size of ciphertexts below linear in n in either the anonymous or non-anonymous setting is impossible.
Anonymous Broadcast Encryption
We define a model of public-key Broadcast Encryption, where algorithms are specified to allow for anonymity (similarly to [5] ) and they are general enough to include the identity-based variant of BE introduced in [19] . Definition 1. Let U = {1, ..., n} be the universe of users. A broadcast encryption (BE) scheme is defined by four algorithms and has associated message space MSP and ciphertext space CSP.
BE.Setup(λ, n): This algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ and the number of users in the system n. It outputs a master public key BE-MPK and a master secret key BE-MSK. BE.Key-Gen(BE-MPK, BE-MSK, i): This algorithm takes as input BE-MPK, BE-MSK and an index i ∈ U and outputs the private key sk i for user i. BE.Enc(BE-MPK, m, S): This algorithm takes as input BE-MPK, a message m ∈ MSP and a subset S ⊆ U , the broadcast target set. It outputs a ciphertext c ∈ CSP. BE.Dec(BE-MPK, sk i , c): This algorithm takes as input BE-MPK, a private key sk i and a ciphertext c ∈ CSP. It outputs either a message m ∈ MSP or a failure symbol ⊥.
The correctness property is that for all S ⊆ U and all i ∈ U if c = BE.Enc(BE-MPK, m, S) and sk i is the private key for i ∈ S then BE.Dec(BE-MPK, sk i , c) = m with overwhelming probability.
We observe that this definition no longer requires the set S as an input to the decryption algorithm. This is crucial in developing the notion of anonymous broadcast encryption (ANOBE), for which we next provide an appropriate security model for the case of adaptive adversaries. Definition 2. We define the ANO-IND-CCA security game for BE as follows. Setup. The challenger C runs BE.Setup(λ, n) to generate master public key BE-MPK and master secret key BE-MSK and gives BE-MPK to the adversary A. Phase 1. A can issue queries to a private key extraction oracle for any index i ∈ U . The oracle will respond by returning sk i = BE.Key-Gen(BE-MPK, BE-MSK, i). A can also issue decryption queries of the form (c, i), where i ∈ U , and the oracle will return the decryption BE.Dec(BE-MPK, sk i , c). Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ MSP and two distinct sets S 0 , S 1 ⊆ U of users. We require that S 0 and S 1 be of equal size and also impose the restriction that A has not issued key queries for any i ∈ S 0 S 1 = (S 0 \ S 1 ) ∪ (S 1 \ S 0 ). Further, if there exists an i ∈ S 0 ∩ S 1 for which A has queried the key, then we require that m 0 = m 1 . The adversary A passes m 0 , m 1 and S 0 , S 1 to C. The latter picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes c * = BE.Enc(BE-MPK,m b , S b ) which is returned to A. Phase 2. A continues to make queries to the private key extraction oracle with the restrictions that i / ∈ S 0 S 1 and that, if i ∈ S 0 ∩ S 1 , then m 0 = m 1 . A may continue issuing decryption queries (c, i) with the restriction that if c = c * then either i / ∈ S 0 S 1 or i ∈ S 0 ∩ S 1 and m 0 = m 1 . Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b for b. Definition 3. We say that a BE scheme is anonymous and semantically secure against chosenciphertext attacks (ANO-IND-CCA) if all polynomial-time adaptive adversaries A have at most negligible advantage in the above game, where A's advantage is defined as Adv
Like the definition of [5] , Definition 2 does not require the ANOBE ciphertext to hide the number of receivers. However, specific schemes (such as the one in Section 3.1) can also conceal the cardinality of S.
We will next show that this notion is indeed feasible by presenting a generic construction that relies solely on the existence of IND-CCA secure PKE schemes. We will then improve its performance by giving alternative generic constructions whose underlying primitives require additional security properties.
3 Generic Constructions for ANOBE from PKE
ANOBE from Minimal Assumptions
Since our aim is to provide a formal treatment of anonymous broadcast encryption, we begin by showing that ANOBE can be achieved. Indeed, by simply assuming the existence of an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme we can construct an ANOBE scheme as follows.
Let π pke = (Gen, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a PKE scheme with message space M = {0, 1} m . Here, algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter and outputs public parameters par, used by KeyGen to generate a key pair (pk, sk). Let Σ = (G, S, V) be a one-time signature scheme consisting of a key generation algorithm G, a signing algorithm S and a verification algorithm V. We assume that the key space of Σ is K = {0, 1} v , for some v ∈ poly(λ). We use π pke and Σ to generically instantiate a BE scheme, with message space {0, 1} m−v . In the description hereafter, we include the symbol ε as a valid but distinguished message in {0, 1} m−v : in other words, all the messages that receivers accept as legal plaintexts are different from ε.
BE.Setup(λ, n): Generate par ← Gen(λ) and, for i = 1 to n, generate (sk i , pk i ) ← Keygen(par).
The master private key is BE-MSK = {sk i } n i=1 and the master public key consists of
BE.Key-Gen(BE-MPK, BE-MSK, i): parse the master secret key BE-MSK as {sk i } n i=1 and output sk i . BE.Enc(BE-MPK, M, S): to encrypt a message M for a receiver set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, generate a one-time signature key pair (SK, VK) ← G(λ). Then, for all indices j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compute
The correctness of the BE scheme follows directly from the correctness of π pke and Σ. This construction is reminiscent of generic constructions of chosen-ciphertext-secure multiple encryption [23] and it is easily seen to yield a secure ANOBE. A proof of the following theorem is available in Appendix A. Theorem 1. Let π pke be an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme and let Σ be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. The BE scheme constructed above is ANO-IND-CCA secure against adaptive adversaries.
We have described an ANOBE scheme from minimal assumptions. We note that encryption time is linear in n but decryption is performed in constant time, since a user simply selects the ciphertext component to decrypt according to its index. However, the ciphertext size is linear in n, as we encrypt to each user in the universe. It is desirable to improve on this and achieve a realization of ANOBE with more compact ciphertexts. We will next see how to modify this first generic construction, obtaining an ANOBE scheme whose ciphertext size is linear in the size of the target set S.
ANOBE with Adaptive Security from Robust, Anonymous PKE
A simple solution to the broadcast problem is to encrypt the message under the public key of each user in the privileged set. This naive approach, so often discarded in most BE literature due to efficiency reasons, turns out to provide another generic construction for ANOBE, which differs from the previous one as now we deploy a public-key encryption scheme only to encrypt the message to the users in the target set.
For this approach, the underlying PKE scheme has to be key-private (or IK secure [6] ), in that the ciphertext does not leak under which public key it was created. We also require the PKE scheme to be weakly robust, in the sense of [2] , not only for correctness but also for consistency in the CCA security proof simulation. This property can be generically achieved [2] for any PKE scheme, by appending some publicly-known redundancy to the message and checking it upon decryption. This is essentially the construction that was already suggested by Barth, Boneh and Waters [5] . We now prove that it is actually adaptively secure, rather than just statically secure, as was established in [5] .
Let π pke = (Gen, Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a PKE scheme and Σ = (G, S, V) be a signature scheme. We construct an ANOBE scheme, ANOBE π pke ,Σ , as follows.
BE.Setup(λ, n): Run Gen(λ, n) to obtain public parameters par. For i = 1 to n, run Keygen(par) to generate (sk i , pk i ). The master private key is BE-MSK = {sk i } n i=1 and the master public key is BE-MPK = par, Σ,
BE.Key-Gen(BE-MPK, BE-MSK, i): parse BE-MSK as {sk i } n i=1 and output sk i . BE.Enc(BE-MPK, M, S): to encrypt M for a receiver set S = {i 1 , . . . , i } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size = |S|, generate a signature key pair (SK, VK) ← G(λ). Then, for each j = 1 to , compute
The ANOBE ciphertext is C = VK, C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) , σ , where σ = S SK, C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation.
BE.Dec(BE-MPK, sk i , C): parse C as a tuple VK, C 1 , . . . , C , σ . If V VK, C 1 , . . . , C , σ = 0, return ⊥. Otherwise, repeat the following steps for j = 1 to .
If M =⊥ and can moreover be parsed as M = M ||VK for some M of appropriate length, return M .
The correctness of ANOBE π pke ,Σ follows directly from the correctness and weak robustness of π pke .
Theorem 2. ANOBE π pke ,Σ is adaptively ANO-IND-CCA secure assuming that: (i) π pke is keyprivate and IND-CCA (AI-CCA) secure and weakly robust under chosen-ciphertext attacks (as defined in Appendix F); (ii) Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme.
In our proof (given in Appendix B) we make use of a sequence of hybrid arguments where ciphertext components are gradually modified at each step and each hybrid argument requires the reduction to guess upfront the identity of an uncorrupted user. We note that Gentry and Waters [29] already briefly mentioned that such an approach could potentially be useful to prove adaptive security but, to the best of our knowledge, no rigorous analysis of this type was previously given in the literature. Moreover, in the constructions that follow, achieving adaptive security represents even more of a challenge since it is a non-trivial task to get this proof technique to suitably interact with the methods we present for speeding up encryption and decryption procedures. In terms of efficiency, from this construction we will obtain secure ANOBE schemes with typically very small (constant) private key storage requirements and ciphertexts which are |S| times the size of the ciphertext of the underlying PKE scheme. Encryption and decryption have both cost linear in the size of S. If, for example (as suggested in [5] ), we use the Cramer-Shoup PKE scheme to instantiate the ANOBE scheme, the private keys will have constant size (namely 5 elements in Z p ), and the resulting ciphertext will consist of roughly 4 · |S| group elements. The scheme will be secure in the standard model under the DDH assumption.
If we look at recent efficient instantiations of BE, for example that of Gentry-Waters [29], we have private keys whose size is linear in the number of users, and ciphertexts which consist of n bits plus 3 group elements (if we include the cost of transmitting a description of S as part of the ciphertext). It is clear that in general the solution of [29] is more efficient in terms of ciphertext size. The key point though is that it is not anonymous.
Generic Construction for ANOBE from IBE
An IBE scheme I typically consists of four algorithms (Setup, KeyExt, Enc, Dec), where Setup and KeyExt are run by a trusted authority (TA). In our construction we will make use of a multi-TA IBE scheme I = (CommonSetup, TASetup, KeyDer, Enc , Dec ) as formalised in [40] . We recall from [40] that CommonSetup, on input the security parameter, outputs the system's parameters par and a set of labels of the TAs in the system, and that TASetup, on input par, outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk. This algorithm is randomized and executed independently for each TA in the system. The remaining algorithms are as per a normal IBE scheme. For this primitive we consider the notion of TA anonymity, as defined in [40] , which formally models the inability of the adversary to distinguish two ciphertexts corresponding to the same message and identity, but created using different TA master public keys. An example of a TA-anonymous IBE scheme is the multi-TA version of Gentry's IBE scheme [28] developed in [41] . Now, let I = (CommonSetup, TASetup, KeyDer, Enc , Dec ) be a weakly robust, in the sense of definition 10 (in Appendix F.2), multi-TA IBE scheme and let Σ = (G, S, V) be a signature scheme. We will use I and Σ to generically instantiate a BE scheme in the following way.
BE.Setup(λ, n): Run CommonSetup on input of λ ∈ N to obtain the system's parameters par. Run TASetup(par) n times to obtain n key-pairs {mpk i , msk i } i∈U . Return the par, Σ and n public keys {mpk i } i∈U . BE.Key-Gen(par, λ, i): Return msk i , the secret key corresponding to the public key mpk i of user i. BE.Enc(par, M, S): Run G to obtain a verification key VK and the corresponding signing key SK.
For each i ∈ S run Enc (mpk i , M, VK) to obtain ciphertext C i . The ANOBE ciphertext is
where σ = S SK, C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation. BE.Dec(par, msk i , C): Parse the ciphertext C as VK, C 1 , . . . , C , σ . If V VK, C 1 , . . . , C , σ = 0, return ⊥. Otherwise, compute sk i VK = KeyDer(mpk i , msk i , VK) and repeat the following steps for j = 1 to .
The correctness of the BE scheme follows directly from the correctness and a certain weak robustness property (formalized by Definition 10 in Appendix F.2) of the IBE scheme I used to construct it.
If instantiated with the multi-TA version of Gentry's IBE scheme [28, 41] (which can be made weakly robust simply by applying the transform in [2] ), this construction yields very short constant size private keys (just one element in Z * p ) and ciphertexts consisting of roughly 3·|S| group elements (|S| in G and 2 · |S| in G T ) plus a signature and a verification key. Encryption and decryption have both cost linear in the size of S.
Theorem 3. Let I be a TA-anonymous, sID-IND-CPA secure IBE scheme and let Σ be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature. Then, the above BE scheme is adaptively ANO-IND-CCA secure.
We give some intuition for the proof. We observe that, in [41] , the authors apply a modified version of the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transform [14] using the same primitives as our generic construction to obtain a key-private IND-CCA PKE scheme. We introduce further modifications to build a BE scheme achieving ANO-IND-CCA security. The idea is that, within this transform, we encrypt m for the same identity VK under the |S| different public keys. We then sign all ciphertexts and append the verification key VK (note that this signature binds all these ciphertexts together). Upon decryption, a user verifies the signature against VK and, if valid, proceeds to derive the decryption key for identity VK by running the IBE key-extraction algorithm on input his private key. By similar arguments to those in [14] and [41] , and by applying techniques analogous to those proving adaptive security in Theorem 2, we can show that adaptive ANO-IND-CCA security is achieved.
Efficient Decryption in the Standard Model
The generic constructions for ANOBE presented in Section 3.2 and 4 both suffer from linear time decryption. This arises from the fact that users do not know which ciphertext component is intended for them, and hence will have to perform an average of |S|/2 decryptions before recovering the message. Clearly this procedure is quite cumbersome. We now present a technique which achieves constant time decryption in the standard model. We make use of a new primitive, called tag-based anonymous hint systems, for which we provide a definition, the relevant security models and a concrete instantiation.
Tag-Based Anonymous Hint Systems
A tag-based anonymous hint system can be seen as a tag-based encryption scheme [33] allowing to generate weak forms of encryption under a tag t and a public key pk. The result of the process consists of a value U and a hint H. The pair (U, H) should be pseudo-random (in particular, hints generated under two distinct public keys should be indistinguishable) when only the public key pk is available. Also, the private key sk makes it possible to check whether a given hint H is valid w.r.t. a tag t. A value-hint pair can be seen as an extractable commitment to a public key. Formally, such a system is defined in terms of the following algorithms.
Keygen(cp) : takes as input a set of common public parameters cp and outputs a key pair (sk, pk).
We assume that cp specifies a randomness space R h and a space T h of acceptable tags for the scheme. Hint(cp, t, pk, r): is a deterministic algorithm taking as input common public parameters cp, a public key pk, a tag t and random coins r ∈ R R h . It outputs pair (U, H) consisting of a value U and a hint H. It is required that U only depends on the random coins r and not on pk. Invert(cp, sk, t, U ): is a deterministic "inversion" algorithm taking as input a value U , a tag t and a private key sk. It outputs either a hint H or ⊥ if U is not in the appropriate domain.
Correctness requires that, for any pair (sk, pk) ← Keygen(λ) and any possible random coins r, if (U, H) ← Hint(t, pk, r), then Invert(cp, sk, t, U ) = H. Although hint systems bear similarities with tag-KEMs, as formalized by Abe et al. [3] , the two primitives are different and incomparable. In the tag-KEM syntax, the symmetric "session key" is chosen first and it does not depend on the tag. In hint schemes, the syntax requires to choose a pair (U, H), where U does not depend on pk but the session key H can depend on both pk and the tag (this is what happens in the construction we give). The security definitions are also different since, in Definition 4 hereafter, there is no inversion oracle (that would return H given U and t) but only a verification oracle that determines if (U, H, t) form a valid triple with respect to public keys pk 0 and pk 1 .
In certain aspects, hint schemes are reminiscent of extractable hash proof systems [44] but there are several differences. In [44] , in addition to the value that we call U , the random coins allowing to compute U are used to compute a witness S such that (U, S) satisfies some relation. From U , the element S is also computable using the private key and the value that we call H (which is termed "hash value" in [44]). At the same time, S should be infeasible to compute without the private key or the random coins used to sample U . Hint schemes are different in that they rather require the hardness of computing H from U without the private key. In addition, tag-based hints require that it be hard to decide if a pair (U, H) is valid for a certain tag t (i.e., to decide if H = Invert(cp, sk, t , U )) even with access to a decision oracle for tags t = t .
Definition 4.
A tag-based hint system (Keygen, Hint, Invert) is anonymous if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. On input of common public parameters cp, the adversary A chooses a tag t and sends it to the challenger. 2. The challenger generates pairs (sk 0 , pk 0 ) ← Keygen(λ), (sk 1 , pk 1 ) ← Keygen(λ) and gives pk 0 , pk 1 to A.
3. On polynomially-many occasions, A adaptively invokes a verification oracle on value-hint-tag triples (U, H, t) such that t = t . The challenger replies by returning bits Definition 5. A tag-based hint system (Keygen, Hint, Invert) is strongly robust if no PPT adversary A has non-negligible advantage in the following game, where A's advantage is its probability of success.
1. The challenger chooses public parameters cp and generates pairs (sk 0 , pk 0 ) ← Keygen(λ), (sk 1 , pk 1 ) ← Keygen(λ). It gives cp and pk 0 , pk 1 to A.
2.
A invokes a verification oracle on arbitrary value-hint-tag triples (U, H, t). The challenger replies by returning bits
A outputs a triple (U , H , t ) and wins if the latter satisfies H = Invert(cp, sk 0 , t , U ) = 1 and H = Invert(cp, sk 1 , t , U ) = 1.
Analogously to the PKE case [2] , weak robustness for tag-based hint systems is defined by letting the adversary simply make a challenge request in step 3. The challenger then chooses a tag t as well as random coins r , generates a value-hint pair (U , H ) = Hint(cp, t , pk 0 , r ) and A wins if H = Invert(cp, sk 1 , t , U ) = 1. Weak robustness will be sufficient for our purposes but the scheme hereafter is also strongly robust under the discrete logarithm assumption in G.
To show that this newly defined primitive is indeed feasible, we give an example of an anonymous hint system based on the DDH assumption and the CCA-secure public key encryption scheme described in [15] .
Let the common public parameters cp = {G, p, g} consist of a group G of prime order p > 2 λ with a generator g ∈ R G. We assume that tags are elements of T h = Z * p and that the randomness space is R h = Z * p .
Keygen(cp): chooses random x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 $ ← Z * p and computes X i = g x i and Y i = g y i for each i ∈ {1, 2}. The public key is pk = X 1 , X 2 , Y 1 , Y 2 and the private key is sk = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ). Hint(cp, t, pk, r):
The following results are proved in Appendix C and D, respectively. Lemma 1. The above tag-based hint scheme is anonymous if the DDH assumption holds in G.
Lemma 2. The hint scheme is strongly robust under the discrete logarithm assumption in G.
We will now use an anonymous hint system to generically obtain ANOBE with efficient decryption.
ANOBE with Efficient Decryption
Let π hint = (Keygen, Hint, Invert) be an anonymous hint system with its set of common public parameters cp. Let π pke = (Gen, Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a PKE scheme and Σ = (G, S, V) be a signature scheme.
BE.Setup(λ, n): Obtain (par) ← Gen(λ) and, for i = 1 to n, and generate encryption key pairs (sk i ,pk i ) ← π pke .Keygen(par) and hint key pairs (sk h i , pk h i ) ← π hint .Keygen(cp). The master public key consists of
and the master private key is BE-
BE.Enc(BE-MPK, M, S): to encrypt a message M for a receiver set S = {i 1 , . . . , i } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size = |S|, generate a one-time signature key pair (SK, VK) ← G(λ). Then, choose r $ ← R h and compute (U, H j ) = π hint .Hint(cp, VK, pk h i j , r) for j = 1 to (recall that the first output U of Hint does not depend on the public key). Then, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , }, compute a ciphertext C j = π pke .Encrypt(par,pk i j , M ||VK). Choose a random permutation τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } and set the final ciphertext as
Otherwise, let j be the smallest index such that H = H j and compute M = π pke .Decrypt(sk i , C j ). If M can be parsed as M = M ||VK for some M of appropriate length, return M . Otherwise, output ⊥.
The correctness of this scheme follows directly from the correctness and weak robustness of its component schemes π hint and π pke .
The proof of the following theorem is deferred to Appendix E.
Theorem 4. The above construction is adaptively ANO-IND-CCA secure assuming that (i) π hint is anonymous; (ii) π pke is AI-CCA secure and weakly robust under chosen-ciphertext attacks; (iii) Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature.
In [5] , a technique to speed up decryption was presented. The scheme of [5] can be seen as using a hint scheme where tags are empty strings and pairs (U, H j ) consist of U = g r and H j = H(X r i j ), where H is a random oracle and X i j ∈ G is the public key of the hint scheme. In the present context, it is tempting to believe that simple hints of the form X r i j suffice to achieve efficient decryption in the standard model. Indeed, one step of the proof consists of a DDH-based transition from one hybrid game to another and, during that specific transition, the simulator B could simply handle all decryption queries using the private keys {sk i } n i=1 in the underlying encryption scheme since it knows them all. For reasons that will become apparent in the proof of a key lemma for Theorem 4 below, this does not suffice. The reason is that, the adversary can issue decryption queries where
) does not form a Diffie-Hellman tuple. In this case, the answer of the simulator would differ from that of the real decryption procedure in the chosen-ciphertext scenario: more precisely, the simulation could accept a ciphertext that would be rejected by a real decryption.
In [5] , this problem was addressed using a random oracle and the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption [39]: each hint was of the form H j = H(X r i j ), where H is the random oracle. By invoking the DDH-oracle at each random oracle query, the simulator was able to figure out which ciphertext components had to be decrypted so as to perfectly emulate the real decryption algorithm. Here, we address this issue in the standard model using the tag-based anonymous hint primitive.
From a practical standpoint, it is convenient to instantiate the above construction by combining our DDH-based hint scheme with an encryption scheme based on the same assumption such as the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem. Interestingly both schemes can be instantiated using the same DDHhard cyclic group. Considering efficiency, it is moreover possible to recycle the group element g r of the hint system and simultaneously use it as part of a Cramer-Shoup ciphertext. In the security proof, everything goes through with these optimizations although we omit the details here.
Reducing the Size of the Ciphertext with Randomness Re-Use
This section considers randomness re-use as a technique to optimize ANOBE constructions. Randomness re-use [7, 4] is a powerful tool that provides computational and bandwidth savings. In [7] , Bellare et al. introduce a property, called reproducibility, providing a condition under which randomness re-use is secure. We define the notion of key-less reproducibility, which is better suited for the anonymity setting.
Definition 6. Let π pke = (Gen, Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a PKE scheme. Let M and R be the message and randomness space of π pke . Let R be an algorithm that takes as input the public parameters, a ciphertext, another random message and a key pair (sk, pk), and outputs a ciphertext. Consider the experiment:
π pke is key-less reproducible if, for any λ, there is a PPT algorithm R such that the above experiment outputs 1 with probability 1.
We note that this definition differs from the one in [7] since the algorithm R does not take pk (the public key under which c was created) as an input. Indeed, this is a crucial difference which allows extending the notion of reproducibility to the context where anonymity is required. We now reconsider the generic construction for ANOBE presented in Section 3.2.
Let Σ = (G, S, V) be a signature scheme, and let π pke = (Gen, Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be a key-less reproducible PKE scheme. We call ANOBE π pke ,Σ rr the scheme constructed from Σ and π pke as follows.
BE.Setup, BE.Key-Gen, BE.Dec are as in Section 3.2. BE.Enc(BE-MPK, M, S): to encrypt M for a receiver set S = {i 1 , . . . , i } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size = |S|, generate a signature key pair (SK, VK) ← G(λ). Choose r $ ← R, where R is the randomness space of π pke par . Then, for each j = 1 to , compute C j = Encrypt(par, pk i j , M ||VK; r). The final BE ciphertext consists of C = VK, C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) , σ , where σ = S SK, C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation.
Theorem 5. Let π pke = (Gen, Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) be an AI-CCA secure, weakly robust and key-less reproducible PKE scheme. Let Σ be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. Then ANOBE π pke ,Σ rr is adaptively ANO-IND-CCA secure.
The proof for Theorem 5 is analogous to that of Theorem 2, the only difference being the use of algorithm R in the simulation. Proof sketch. The proof follows precisely the proof of Theorem 2 up until the BE challenge ciphertext is generated. The modifications are in the following steps and apply to both Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
We observe that B knows all the necessary secret keys since it generated them on its own at the beginning of the simulation. The proof then continues as in Theorem 2.
We note that there is no further loss in the security reduction since the key-less reproducibility property of π pke implies that Encrypt(par, pk , m ; r) = R(par, Encrypt(par, pk, m; r), m , pk , sk ) with probability 1.
We have shown that the key-less reproducibility of a PKE scheme guarantees that randomness can be re-used securely. We can exploit this property to compress the ANOBE ciphertexts and, depending on the concrete instantiation, significantly increase the efficiency of the scheme. More precisely, given an ANOBE π pke ,Σ rr ciphertext C = (VK, C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) , σ), let ccc denote the common ciphertext components that may arise in C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) from sharing randomness across PKE components, i.e.,
The compressed ANOBE ciphertext will beC = (VK, ccc,c τ (1) , . . . ,c τ ( ) , σ). Upon receipt, the user simply reconstitutes the original ciphertext C and runs BE.Dec as usual. We explore instantiations of this idea next.
An Efficient Instantiation of ANOBE from Kurosawa-Desmedt
This section presents an ANOBE scheme based on a randomness re-using variant of the KurosawaDesmedt encryption scheme KD * [36] (which is described in Appendix G). KD * is an ideal candidate for our purposes since it is AI-CCA secure (the proof is in Appendix G) and key-less reproducible (Lemma 10). Moreover, as shown in Appendix G, it can easily be made strongly robust [2] under mild assumptions on the involved symmetric components: namely, the hash function H must be pre-image resistant; the key derivation function has to be collision-resistant and the symmetric encryption scheme must be key-binding (as defined in [37] ) as well as a secure authenticated encryption scheme (as already required by its proof of IND-CCA security [21] ).
Concrete instantiation. The following scheme is obtained from KD * by optimizing our generic construction and removing redundant ciphertext components from the overall ciphertext: namely, (g r 1 , g r 2 ) only has to appear once in the ANOBE ciphertext and this change is easily seen not to affect the security analysis.
BE.Setup(λ, n): chooses a group G of prime order p > 2 λ with generators g 1 , g 2 $ ← Z p as well as a universal one-way hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p . It also selects a key derivation function KDF : G → {0, 1} k , for some k ∈ poly(λ), a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme Σ = (G, S, V) and a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme Π sym-enc = (E, D). Then, for i = 1 to n, choose x i,1 , x i,2 , y i,1 , y i,2 $ ← Z p and compute elements c i = g
The master public key consists of
and output user i's private key
BE.Enc(BE-MPK, m, S): to encrypt m for a receiver set S = {i 1 , . . . , i } ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size = |S|, generate a signature key pair (SK, VK) ← G(λ), pick r $ ← Z * p and compute the common part of the ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 ) = (g r 1 , g r 2 ) ∈ G 2 . Then, for each j = 1 to , compute α = H(u 1 , u 2 ) as well as
The ciphertext is C = VK, u 1 , u 2 , e τ (1) , . . . , e τ ( ) , σ , where σ = S SK, (u 1 , u 2 , e τ (1) , . . . , e τ ( ) ) is a signature and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation.
BE.Dec(sk i , C): given sk i = (x i,1 , x i,2 , y i,1 , y i,2 ) and the BE ciphertext C = VK, u 1 , u 2 , e 1 , . . . , e , σ , return ⊥ if V VK, (u 1 , u 2 , e 1 , . . . , e ), σ = 0. Otherwise, compute α = H(u 1 , u 2 ). For j = 1 to , do the following. In Appendix G we show that KD * has all the properties required for our ANOBE construction to be secure: it is AI-CCA (Theorem 7), weakly robust (Theorem 6) and key-less reproducible (Lemma 10). The following result is a direct consequence of Theorem 5 and Theorem 7, Theorem 6 and Lemma 10. Optimizations using labels. We note that the above concrete ANOBE system can be further optimized by using a variant of KD * that supports labels. A label L is essentially a public string that can be non-malleably bound to the ciphertext. To do this in this setting, the simplest solution is to compute the hash value α as α = H(u 1 , u 2 , L). With this modification, Cramer-Shoup and Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystems are easily seen to satisfy label-augmented definitions of chosenciphertext security [42] and anonymity under chosen-ciphertext attacks (see, e.g., [32] ). The only change in the security proofs is that the hash function H must be assumed collision-resistant (and not only target collision-resistant).
Using labels, the above construction is easily modified in such a way that, instead of encrypting times a concatenation M ||VK, we can only encrypt M alone and settle for including VK among the inputs of H and compute α = H(u 1 , u 2 , VK). By doing so, we obtain significantly shorter ciphertexts.
Efficiency comparison. It is interesting to compare the above scheme with the one of Section 3.2 when the latter is instantiated with the Kurosawa-Desmedt cryptosystem. We assume that labels are used in all schemes so as to avoid encrypting VK with the plaintext and also consider that a multi-exponentiation with two base elements has roughly the same cost as a single-base exponentiation. At the sender's end, the scheme of Section 3.2 requires 3 · |S| exponentiations which is essentially three times as expensive as in the above scheme (where only |S| exponentiations are needed).
From a bandwidth point of view, the above construction requires to transmit |S| symmetric authenticated encryptions (which typically consist of a symmetric encryption and a MAC) in addition to two group elements and a one-time verification key. The saving provided by randomness-re-using techniques is thus about 2 · |S| group elements, which, in practice, would be about 50% of the ciphertext size without randomness re-use. Assuming that encrypted messages are at least as short as a group element (which seems reasonable if we encrypt a symmetric key and if group elements are in an elliptic curve subgroup), the ciphertext overhead is about |S| · ( G + M AC ), where G and M AC denote the bitlength of group elements and MAC tags, respectively.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have seen that in the context of broadcast encryption the main focus of research to date has been on reducing ciphertext size. Achieving this has entailed sacrificing all anonymity properties. Yet we have argued that anonymity is a fundamental property to strive for in broadcast encryption. With the aim of highlighting the importance of this overlooked feature, we have formally defined the notion of anonymous broadcast encryption (ANOBE) and given several constructions for this primitive. We have also shown how these constructions can be improved via anonymous hint systems (to optimize decryption performance) and randomness re-use (to reduce the ciphertext size and the computational costs of encryption).
Much work still needs to be done in this area, from improving the efficiency of ANOBE schemes to considering all the additional properties that can be found in standard BE, such as traitor tracing, revocation, dynamism of users joining the system, and realising them in the anonymous setting. There is still a gap between the sizes of ciphertexts in state-of-the-art BE schemes and our ANOBE schemes. This gap is hidden in the constants in an asymptotic evaluation of ciphertext size (when the true size of ciphertexts is measured) but is nevertheless significant in practice. A major challenge, then, is to further reduce the size of ciphertexts in ANOBE, whilst maintaining its full anonymity properties.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We now give a proof of Theorem 1.
We consider a sequence of games starting with Game 0 where the adversary is given an encryption of M 0 for S 0 . In the last game, the adversary obtains an encryption of M 1 under S 1 .
Game 0 real : is the real game when the challenger's bit is set to b = 0. The ANOBE adversary A is given public parameters BE-MPK consisting of n public key encryption keys {pk i } n i=1 . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, user i's private key is sk i . In the first stage, A adaptively chooses indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and obtains the corresponding sk i . The adversary may also query the decryption oracle by sending requests (C, i) which are answered using the relevant private key sk i . In the challenge step, A chooses messages M 0 , M 1 and two subsets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of equal size |S 0 | = |S 1 | = . The challenger generates a one-time signature key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ) and returns the challenge ciphertext C = C 1 , . . . , C n , σ where σ = S(SK , (C 1 , . . . , C n )) and, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, C j is computed as C j = Encrypt(pk j , M 0 ||VK ) if j ∈ S 0 and C j = Encrypt(pk j , ε||VK ) if j ∈ S 0 . In the second phase, A is allowed to make more corruption queries for indices i such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\(S 0 S 1 ) and is granted further access to the decryption oracle under the usual restriction. Upon termination, A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and we define E real 0 to be the event that b = 0.
Game 0: is as Game 0 real with the difference that the challenger now rejects all post-challenge decryption queries C = (C 1 , . . . , C n , σ), i for which C i = C i (i.e., the i-component of C coincides with that of the challenge ciphertext). Clearly, the only situation where the challenger rejects a ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game 0 real is when A breaks the security of the one-time signature. It is easy to see since C i = C i decrypts to a message whose last v bits form the challenge verification key VK as in the challenge phase. We call E 0 the event that A outputs b = 0 in Game 0.
To describe subsequent games, it is convenient to represent the sets S 0 and S 1 as n-bit words s 01 . . . s 0n ∈ {0, 1} n and s 11 . . . s 1n ∈ {0, 1} n such that, for each b ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, s bj = 1 if and only if j ∈ S b .
Game k (1 ≤ k ≤ n): From the two adversarially-chosen sets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} and their respective n-bit words s 01 . . . s 0n and s 11 . . . s 1n , the challenger B generates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
if j > k. The adversary is then returned C = C 1 , . . . , C n , σ and the second phase is handled as in previous games. We call E k the event of A outputting b = 0 at the end of Game k.
Game n real : is identical to Game n with the difference that, when handling decryption queries, the challenger no longer returns ⊥ in decryption queries (C = (C 1 , . . . , C n , σ), i) such that that C i = C i . Game n real thus coincides with the real game when the challenger's bit equals b = 1.
We let E real n be the event that A outputs the bit b = 0 at the end of Game real .
Game 0 real and Game 0 are clearly indistinguishable if the one-time signature is strongly unforgeable and the same argument can be made about Game and Game real . We thus have |Pr[
As for other game transitions, they are justified by lemmas 3 which demonstrates that, if Game k and Game k − 1 can be distinguished for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there must exist either an IND-CCA adversary B against the underlying encryption scheme. Putting the above altogether, we find
Lemma 3. For any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Game k is indistinguishable from Game k − 1 if the public key encryption scheme is IND-CCA. More precisely, we have
Proof. Towards a contradiction, let us assume that an adversary A can distinguish Game k and Game k − 1. We show that it implies a chosen-ciphertext adversary against the cryptosystem. We first recall that, in the challenge phase, the adversarially-chosen messages M 0 , M 1 and sets S 0 , S 1 must be such that either -S 0 = S 1 and M 0 = M 1 , in which case the adversary cannot corrupt any user in S 0 = S 1 (and, of course, we must have |S 0 | = |S 1 | ≥ 1). -S 0 = S 1 , in which case the adversary is disallowed to corrupt anyone in S 0 S 1 .
If we consider the n-bit words s 01 . . . s 0n ∈ {0, 1} n and s 11 . . . s 1n ∈ {0, 1} associated with S 0 and S 1 , Game k is identical to Game k − 1 if s 0k = s 1k = 0 (since C k is an encryption of ⊥ in both games) and we thus assume that s 0k = s 1k = 1 or s 0k = s 1k . Moreover, if s 0k = s 1k = 1 (in other words, if k ∈ S 0 ∩ S 1 ), the adversary can only corrupt sk k in the situation where M 0 = M 1 , in which case Game k and Game k − 1 are also identical. In the following, we can thus only consider the situation s 0k = s 1k (i.e., k ∈ S 0 S 1 ), in which the adversary cannot legally query sk k .
Our IND-CCA adversary B receives a public key pk from its challenger and to prepare BE-MPK for A, it has to generate n encryption keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n . To do this, B defines pk k = pk . Then, B runs the key generation algorithm of π pke itself and generates n−1 key pairs (sk i , pk i ) ← Keygen(1 λ ) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{k}. It finally hands the master public key BE-MPK = {pk i } n i=1 , Σ to A.
At any time, A can corrupt an arbitrary user i ∈ {1, . . . , n} depending on the previously collected information. At each corruption query, B can consistently answer the query since it knows secret keys {sk i } i =k (recall that, according to the rules, should be denied access to sk k ). When A queries the decryption of a ciphertext (C = (C 1 , . . . , C n , σ), i), we assume that i = k (i.e., the query involves the challenge key pk k = pk ) since B can always decrypt by itself otherwise. To simulate the behavior of the decryption algorithm without knowing sk k = sk , B invokes its own decryption oracle on C k . If the IND-CCA challenger's response is not ⊥ and can be parsed as M ||VK, for some message M ∈ {0, 1} m−v and some bitstring VK ∈ {0, 1} v , B returns M to A if V (VK, (C 1 , . . . , C n ), σ) = 1 and M = ε. In any other situation, B returns ⊥, meaning that C k fails to decrypt properly under sk k .
In the challenge phase, A outputs messages M 0 , M 1 and two subsets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of equal size. At this step, B generates a one-time signature key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ) and constructs two messages M 0 , M 1 as follows.
-If s 0k = 1 and s 1k = 0, it sets M 0 = M 0 ||VK and M 1 = ε||VK .
-If s 0k = 0 and s 1k = 1, it sets M 0 = ε||VK and
The two messages M 0 and M 1 are sent to B's IND-CCA challenger which returns a challenge ciphertext C = Encrypt(pk , M b ), for some internally flipped random bit b ∈ R {0, 1}. The ANOBE challenge ciphertext is generated by setting C k = C and defining remaining ciphertext components as follows, for j = 1 to n.
If s
The ANOBE adversary A is given C = (C 1 , . . . , C n , σ), where σ = S(SK , (C 1 , . . . , C n )). In the second phase, A makes another series of adaptive corruption queries for indices i ∈ S 0 S 1 (and a fortiori such that i = k) and B deals with them as in the first phase. When A makes a decryption query (C, i), B parses the ciphertext C as C = (C 1 , . . . , C n , σ) and handles the query using 
B Proof of Theorem 2
We now give a proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. Recall that, since |S
We consider a sequence of games where the adversary is given an encryption of M 0 for S 0 in Game 0 while, in the last game, the adversary obtains an encryption of M 1 under S 1 .
Game 0 real : corresponds to the real game when the challenger's bit is b = 0. Namely, the ANOBE adversary A is given public parameters BE-MPK containing par and n public keys {pk i } n i=1 . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, user i's private key is sk i . In the first phase, the adversary A adaptively chooses indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and obtains the corresponding sk i . The adversary may also invoke the decryption oracle by making queries (C, i) which are handled using the relevant private key sk i . In the challenge phase, the adversary A comes up with messages M 0 , M 1 and two subsets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of equal size |S 0 | = |S 1 | = with S 0 = S 1 . The challenger generates a onetime signature key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ), parses S 0 as {θ 1 , . . . , θ } and returns the challenge ciphertext C = VK , C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) , σ where C j = Encrypt(par, pk θ j , M 0 ||VK ) for j = 1 to and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation. In the second phase, A is allowed to make more decryption queries (under the usual restriction) and key queries for arbitrary indices i such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\(S 0 S 1 ). Eventually, A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and we define E real 0 to be the event that b = 0.
Game 0: is as Game 0 real but the challenger now rejects all post-challenge decryption queries (C, i) where C contains the same verification key VK as in the challenge phase. We call E 0 the event that A outputs b = 0 in Game 0.
From the two adversarially-chosen sets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the challenger B defines the value φ = |S 0 ∩S 1 | and then considers two ordered sets S 0 = {θ 1 , . . . , θ φ , θ φ+1 , . . . , θ },
. . , ρ } that are obtained by ordering S 0 and S 1 in such a way that θ j = ρ j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , φ} and θ j = ρ j if j ∈ {φ + 1, . . . , }. Then, B generates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
The adversary is then returned C = VK , C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) , σ , for a randomly chosen permutation τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , }, and the second phase is handled as in previous games. We call E k the event of A outputting b = 0 at the end of Game k. Game real : is identical to Game with the difference that, when handling decryption queries, the challenger no longer rejects ciphertexts that contain the verification key VK . Game real actually proceeds like the real game when the challenger's bit is b = 1. We let E real be the event that A outputs the bit b = 0 at the end of Game real .
As for other game transitions, they are justified by lemmas 4 and 5 that separately consider the situations where k ≤ φ and k > φ. More precisely, we have that, if Game k and Game k − 1 can be distinguished for some k ∈ {1, . . . , }, lemmas 4 and 5 show that there exists either a AI-CCA adversary B 2 or a WROB-CCA adversary B 3 (see appendix F for definitions of these two notions) against the encryption scheme. Putting the above arguments altogether, we obtain
Lemma 4. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , φ}, Game k is indistinguishable from Game k −1 if the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CCA. More precisely, we have
Proof. Assuming that an attacker A can distinguish Game k and Game k − 1, we build a chosenciphertext adversary against the public key encryption scheme. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , φ}, we observe that Game k and Game k − 1 are identical when M 0 = M 1 and we thus assume M 0 = M 1 , so that the adversary cannot corrupt any user in S 0 ∩ S 1 . Our IND-CCA adversary B obtains par and a public key pk from its challenger and it has to prepare a master public key BE-MPK comprising n encryption keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n for the ANOBE adversary A. To this end, picks i $ ← {1, . . . , n} at random and defines pk i = pk . Then, B runs Keygen and generates n − 1 key pairs (sk i , pk i ) on its own for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i }. It finally gives the master public key BE-MPK = par, Σ, {pk i } n i=1 to A. At any time, A is allowed to corrupt an arbitrary user i ∈ {1, . . . , n} depending on the information it gathered so far. At each corruption query, B aborts and fails in the event that A chooses to corrupt user i . Otherwise, B is necessarily able to consistently answer the query since it knows secret keys {sk i } i =i . When the adversary A makes a decryption query (C = (VK, C 1 , . . . , C , σ), i), we assume that the query involves the challenge key pk since B can always decrypt itself using sk i otherwise. To simulate the decryption algorithm without knowing the challenge private key sk , B proceeds as follows. For j = 1 to , it resorts to its IND-CCA challenger and asks it for the decryption of C j . If the IND-CCA challenger's response differs from ⊥ and can be parsed as M ||VK, for some message M of appropriate length, B returns M to A. If the counter j reaches its maximal value and no decryption query provided a result of the form M ||VK, B returns ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext fails to decrypt properly.
In the challenge phase, A outputs messages M 0 , M 1 and two subsets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of equal size. At this step, B re-orders S 0 , S 1 as S 0 = {θ 1 , . . . , θ φ , θ φ+1 , . . . , θ }, S 1 = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ φ , ρ φ+1 , . . . , ρ } where θ j = ρ j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , φ}. If θ k = i , B aborts and declares failure and we denote by Good the event that θ k = i .
If the event Good occurs, B chooses a one-time signature key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ) and sends the messages (M 0 ||VK ), (M 1 ||VK ) to its IND-CCA challenger. The latter replies by generating a challenge ciphertext C = Encrypt(par, pk , M b ||VK ), for some internally flipped random bit b $ ← {0, 1}. The ANOBE challenge ciphertext is then generated as follows.
For
The adversary A then receives C = (VK , C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) , σ), where σ = S(SK , C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) ) and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation.
In the second phase, A makes another series of adaptive corruption queries for indices i ∈ S 0 S 1 and B deals with them as in the first phase. Whenever A makes a decryption query (C, i), B parses the ciphertext C as C = (VK, C 1 , . . . , C , σ) and outputs ⊥ if VK = VK or if σ is invalid. Otherwise, if i = i , B simply runs the legal decryption procedure on its own since it knows sk i . If i = i , B appeals to its IND-CCA challenger and the decryption oracle it is given access to. Namely, ciphertexts {C 1 , . . . , C } are handled by repeating the following steps for j = 1 to .
-If C j = C , B considers that C j decrypts to ⊥ under sk (which is legitimate since C would decrypt to M b ||VK and VK = VK ) and does not make use of its decryption oracle. -If C j = C , B queries the decryption of C j . If the result can be parsed as M ||VK for some plaintext M of appropriate length, B outputs M .
If the counter j reaches and no decryption query resulted in a plaintext of the form M ||VK, B returns ⊥. Eventually, the adversary A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs the same result. If B did not abort, its advantage as an IND-CCA adversary is as large as the difference between A's probabilities of outputting 0 in Game k and Game k − 1. Indeed, if B's challenger chooses b = 0, then B is clearly playing Game k − 1 whereas, if b = 1, B is playing Game k. Now, let us assess B's probability not to abort. First, since M 0 = M 1 by hypothesis, A is not allowed to corrupt any user in S 0 ∩ S 1 = {θ 1 , . . . , θ φ }. Since θ k ∈ S 0 ∩ S 1 , a sufficient condition for B not to be asked for the unknown private key sk i is to be lucky when drawing i $ ← {1, . . . , n} and have event Good occurring. This is the case with probability Pr[Good] = 1/n since the choice of i is completely independent of A's view.
Lemma 5. For each k ∈ {φ + 1, . . . , }, Game k is indistinguishable from Game k − 1 if the underlying encryption acheme is AI-CCA secure and weakly robust. More precisely, for any ANOBE adversary distinguishing the two games, there exists either an AI-CCA adversary B or a WROB-CCA adversary B (as defined in appendix F.2) such that
Proof. We prove that, if an ANOBE attacker A is able to distinguish Game k and Game k − 1 for some k ∈ {φ + 1, . . . , }, we can either translate A into an AI-CCA adversary B against the encryption scheme or break its WROB-CCA property. The AI-CCA adversary B takes as input par and two public keys pk 0 , pk 1 from its AI-CCA challenger and we call sk 0 and sk 1 the underlying private keys. Algorithm B has to generate a master public key BE-MPK containing n public key keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n . To this end, B picks two distinct indices i 0 , i 1 $ ← {1, . . . , n} and defines pk i 0 = pk 0 and pk i 1 = pk 1 . Then, B runs Keygen and generates n − 2 key pairs (sk i , pk i ) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i 0 , i 1 }. The master public key BE-MPK = par, Σ, {pk i } n i=1 is provided as input to A. Throughout the game, A can adaptively corrupt any user i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. At each corruption query, B aborts if the queried index i falls in {i 0 , i 1 }. Otherwise, B necessarily knows the queried secret key sk i and hands it to A. For each decryption query (C = (VK, C 1 , . . . , C , σ), i) made by A, B can handle the query on its own whenever i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 }. If i = i 0 (resp. i = i 1 ), B queries its own decryption oracle up to times and successively asks for the decryption of C 1 , . . . , C under sk 0 (resp. sk 1 ). At the first answer that differs from ⊥ and can be parsed as M ||VK, for some M of the right length, B returns M . If B fails to obtain a decryption result of the form M ||VK, for some M , B returns ⊥ to A, meaning that C does not properly decrypt under sk 0 (resp. sk 1 ).
In the challenge phase, A outputs messages M 0 , M 1 and subsets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of equal size . These sets are re-ordered as S 0 = {θ 1 , . . . , θ φ , θ φ+1 , . . . , θ } and S 1 = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ φ , ρ φ+1 , . . . , ρ } where θ j = ρ j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , φ}. If θ k = i 0 or ρ k = i 1 , B aborts. We denote by Good the event (θ k = i 0 ) ∧ (ρ k = i 1 ), which implies pk θ k = pk 0 andpk ρ k =pk 1 .
If Good occurs, B generates a one-time signature key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ) and sends the messages (M 0 ||VK ), (M 1 ||VK ) to its AI-CCA challenger. The latter returns a challenge ciphertext C = Encrypt(par, pk b , M b ||VK ), for some internally flipped random bit b $ ← {0, 1}. The ANOBE adversary's challenge ciphertext is then obtained as follows.
The adversary A receives C = (VK , C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) , σ), where σ = S(SK , (C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) )) and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation.
In the second phase, A makes further adaptive corruption queries for indices i ∈ S 0 S 1 and B handles them as previously. Decryption queries are handled as in the first phase with one difference: if A makes a decryption query (C = (VK, C τ (1) , . . . , C τ ( ) , σ), i) for which we simultaneously have i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 }, VK = VK and C j = C for some j ∈ {1, . . . , }, B considers that C j decrypts to ⊥ under sk i without invoking its own decryption oracles on C j . Since VK = VK , it is clear that C cannot correctly decrypt to a message ending with VK under the private key sk b . Still, we have to rule out the possibility to have Decrypt(sk 1−b , C ) = M ||VK, for some plaintext M , since this could render A's view inconsistent. If this event were to happen with non-negligible probability, algorithm B could be turned into a weak robustness (more precisely, WROB-CCA) adversary B . The latter would simply generate the ANOBE challenge ciphertext by computing C 1 , . . . , C itself and waiting for A to make a decryption query C = (VK, C 1 , . . . , C , σ) for which there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , } such that C j correctly decrypts under both sk b and sk 1−b .
When A halts, it outputs a result b ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs b as well. If B did not abort, its AI-CCA advantage is as large as the gap between A's probabilities of outputting 0 in Game k and Game k − 1. Indeed, if B's AI-CCA challenger sets its challenge bit as b = 0, B is playing Game k − 1 with A whereas, if the AI-CCA challenger sets b = 1, B is playing Game k. Now, let us assess B's probability not to abort. Recall that the adversary A cannot legally corrupt any user in S 0 S 1 = {θ φ+1 , . . . , θ , ρ φ+1 , . . . , ρ }. For this reason, a sufficient condition for A not to query the private keys sk θ k or sk ρ k is to have Good occurring. Since event Good comes about with probability Pr[Good] = 1/n(n − 1) > 1/n 2 , the claimed result follows.
C Proof of Lemma 1
We give a proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games where the first game is the real game and the last one is a game where the challenger's bit b ∈ {0, 1} is unconditionally hidden. In Game i, we call S i the event that b = b.
Game 0: is the real attack game. The adversary begins by choosing a tag t and obtains two public keys pk 0 = (X 0,1 , X 0,2 , Y 0,1 , Y 0,2 ), pk 1 = (X 1,1 , X 1,2 , Y 1,1 , Y 1,2 ) from the challenger that keeps the private keys sk 0 = (x 0,1 , x 0,2 , y 0,1 , y 0,2 ), sk 1 = (x 1,1 , x 1,2 , y 1,1 , y 1,2 ) to itself. The adversary A then makes verification queries for inputs (U, H = (V, W ), t) such that t = t . At each query, the challenger replies by outputting two bits (d 0 , d 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 where d 0 = H = Invert(cp, sk 0 , t, U ) and d 1 = H = Invert(cp, sk 1 , t, U ) . In the challenge phase, the challenger flips a fair binary coin b $ ← {0, 1} and generates the challenge as U ,
p , which is sent to the adversary A. After a second series of queries, A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and we call S 0 the event that b = b.
Game 1: is identical to Game 0 with the following two differences.
-The challenger's bit b $ ← {0, 1} is chosen at the beginning of the game. -In the adversary's challenge (U , V , W ), W is replaced by a random element of G.
The first change is purely conceptual and we argue that, under the DDH assumption, a computationally bounded adversary cannot notice the second one.
To prove this, we show a DDH distinguisher B that bridges between Game 0 and Game 1. Algorithm B takes as input a tuple (g, X = g x , Y = g y , T ), where x, y ∈ R Z * p , and aims at deciding whether T = g xy or T ∈ R G * . At the outset of the game, B picks θ 1 , θ 2 $ ← Z * p and defines X = g θ 1 X θ 2 . When the challenge bit b $ ← {0, 1} is chosen, B honestly generates pk 1−b by choosing
The adversary is given the two public keys (X 0,1 , X 0,1 , Y 0,1 , Y 0,2 ) and (X 1,1 , X 1,2 , Y 1,1 , Y 1,2 ) and we note that they are both uniformly distributed in G 4 as required.
When the adversary A makes a verification query (U, (V, W ), t), with t = t , B can simply run algorithm Invert(cp, sk 1−b , t, U ) since it knows sk 1−b . When it comes to simulate the evaluation of the bit d b = (V, W ) = Invert(cp, sk b , t, U ) , it computes
2 . To see why this test works, we note that, if (U, V, W ) is a valid hint for pk b and t, it must be the case that (Z 1 , Z 2 ) = (X r , X r ), where r = log g (U ), so that the test is satisfied. If U, (V, W ) is not a valid value-hint pair w.r.t. (pk b , t), we must have (U, V, W ) = (g r , (
, where it holds that either r = 0 or r = 0, and this implies that Z 1 =X r+r 1 and Z 2 = X r+r 2 where either r 1 = 0 or r 2 = 0. If r 2 = 0 and r 1 = 0, the equality
2 is never satisfied and we thus assume r 2 = 0. In this case, we can only have
2 by pure chance since, due to the dependence on θ 2 ∈ Z * p , the value U θ 1 Z θ 2 2 =X r · X r 2 ·θ 2 is independent of A's view since it is the product of an information-theoretically fixed termX r with a completely undetermined value X r 2 ·θ 2 . The same arguments as in [15] show that B's probability to incorrectly answer a verification query is at most q/p if q is the number of queries.
In the challenge phase, B constructs the challenge value-hint pair (U , (V , W )) as
It is easy to see that, if T = g xy , A's view is the same as in Game 0 (except with probability q/p) whereas, if T ∈ R G * , B is playing Game 1 with A since W is uniformly distributed in G * . Combining this observation with the above arguments, we find |Pr[
Game 2: is identical to Game 1 but, in the challenge phase V and W are both chosen uniformly in G and independently of U . To argue that A cannot see the difference as long as the DDH assumption holds, we proceed as in the previous transition. Namely, the DDH distinguisher B takes as input (g, X = g x , Y = g y , T ), where x, y ∈ R Z * p , and aims to decide if T = g xy . At the beginning of the game, B picks θ 1 , θ 2 $ ← Z * p and defines
, 1} is chosen, B honestly generates pk 1−b as in the transition from Game 0 to Game 1. Then, it computes pk b by picking α, β 1 , β 2 , β 3
The adversary is given pk 0 = (X 0,1 , X 0,1 , Y 0,1 , Y 0,2 ) and pk 1 = (X 1,1 , X 1,2 , Y 1,1 , Y 1,2 ) which are both uniformly distributed in G 4 as required.
Whenever the adversary A sends a verification query U, (V, W ), t , B aborts in the unlikely event that β 3 · t = p − 1 (since β 3 is chosen at random independently of A's view, this happens with probability at most q/p during the game). Otherwise, it can compute
. Otherwise, the second output bit d b of the verification algorithm is declared to be 0. In addition, B can run Invert(cp, sk 1−b , t, U ) normally since it knows sk 1−b . The above test is easily seen to work (with overwhelming probability) for the same reasons as in the transition from Game 0 to Game 1. The only situation where B fails to answer verification queries in the same way as in Game 2 is when β 3 · t = p − 1 at some verification query. When taking into account the tiny probability of this event, we find that |Pr[
When it comes to construct the challenge U , (V , W ) for the adversary, B chooses W $ ← G * at random and generates (U , V ) as
It is easy to see that, if T = g xy , the challenger B is playing Game 1 with the adversary. If T ∈ R G , A and B are playing Game 2. In Game 2, the challenge U , (V , W ) is just a sequence of three independent random group elements that carries no information about the bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, we have Pr[S 2 ] = 1/2. By combining the above arguments, we obtain
D Proof of Lemma 2
We give a proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Assuming the existence of a strong robustness adversary A, we construct an algorithm B that receives as input (G, p, g, X) and computes x = log g (X) ∈ Z p with overwhelming probability. To generate the public keys pk 0 and pk 1 , B begins by definingX = g θ 1 X θ 2 for randomly chosen
, 1}, and computes
The adversary is given pk 0 = (X 0,1 , X 0,2 , Y 0,1 , Y 0,2 ) and pk 1 = (X 1,1 , X 1,2 , Y 1,1 , Y 1,2 ) and starts making verification queries.
At each verification query U, (V, W ), t , B aborts if β i,1 · t + β i,2 = 0 or δ i,1 · t + δ i,2 = 0 for some i ∈ {0, 1} (since A has no information on (β i,1 , β i,2 , δ i,1 , δ i,2 ), this only happens with probability q/p throughout the game). Otherwise, B replies by computing
and
for each i ∈ {0, 1}. If it turns out that Z i,2 = U θ 1 Z θ 2 i,1 for some i ∈ {0, 1}, the reduction B replies that (V, W ) = Invert(cp, sk i , t, U ) = 1. We note that, if U, (V, W ) is valid for pk i , we must have Z 1,i = X r and Z i,2 =X r , where r = log g (U ), for the same reason as in the proof of lemma 1. The same arguments show that B's probability to incorrectly answer a verification query is at most q/p.
We note that the adversary is successful if some verification query U , (V , W ), t results in the output (1, 1) (namely, U is inverted to (V , W ) under both private keys sk 0 and sk 1 ). The same arguments as in the proof of lemma 1 guarantee that, except with probability 2/p, the equalities
hold for some r ∈ Z * p . Since r = 0, this implies
In particular, we thus have g α 0,1 t +α 0,2 X β 0,1 t +β 0,2 = g α 1,1 t +α 1,2 X β 1,1 t +β 1,2 and thus
The probability to have
) are uniformly chosen in (Z * p ) 2 and independent of A's view. It comes that the equality (D.1) allows B to compute
) .
E Proof of Theorem 4
We give a proof for Theorem 4.
Proof. Recall that, since
Game 0 real : corresponds to the real game when the challenger's bit is b = 0. Namely, the adversary A is given public parameters BE-MPK containing n tuples {(pk i , pk h i } n i=1 . For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, user i's private key is a pair sk i = (sk i , sk h i ). In the first phase, the adversary A adaptively chooses indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and obtains the corresponding sk i . The adversary may also invoke the decryption oracle by making queries (C, i) which are handled using the relevant private key sk i . At the challenge phase A chooses messages M 0 , M 1 and two subsets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size |S 0 | = |S 1 | = such that S 0 = S 1 . The challenger generates a one-time signature key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ), picks a random exponent r $ ← R h , parses S 0 as {θ 1 , . . . , θ } and returns the challenge ciphertext C = VK , U, (H τ (1) , C τ (1) ), . . . , (H τ ( ) , C τ ( ) ), σ where (U, H j ) = π hint .Hint(cp, VK , pk h θ j , r), C j = π pke .Encrypt(pk θ j , M 0 ||VK ) for j = 1 to and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation. In phase 2, A makes further decryption queries (with the usual restriction) and key queries for arbitrary indices i such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\(S 0 S 1 ). Eventually, A outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and we define E real 0 to be the event that b = 0.
Game 0: is as Game 0 real but the challenger now rejects all post challenge decryption queries (C, i) where C contains the same verification key VK as in the challenge phase. We call E 0 the event that A outputs b = 0 in Game 0.
Game 0 : is defined to be identical to Game 0 for convenience.
is identical to Game k − 1' but, in the challenge phase is processed differently. From the two adversarially-chosen sets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the challenger B defines the value φ = |S 0 ∩ S 1 | and then considers two ordered sets S 0 = {θ 1 , . . . , θ φ , θ φ+1 , . . . , θ }, S 1 = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ φ , ρ φ+1 , . . . , ρ } that are obtained by ordering S 0 and S 1 in such a way that θ j = ρ j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , φ} and θ j = ρ j if j ∈ {φ + 1, . . . , }. Then, B picks r $ ← R h and constructs the challenge ciphertext as follows.
The adversary is then returned
, σ , for a randomly chosen permutation τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , }, and the second phase is handled as in previous games. We call E k the event of A outputting b = 0 at the end of Game k. Game k' (1 ≤ k ≤ ): is identical to Game k but the challenge ciphertext C is now generated as follows.
We denote by E k the event that the adversary outputs b = 0 in Game k'.
Game real : is identical to Game with the difference that, when handling decryption queries, the challenger no longer rejects ciphertexts that contain the verification key VK . Game real actually proceeds like the real game when the challenger's bit is b = 1. We let E real be the event that A outputs the bit b = 0 at the end of Game real .
As for other game transitions, they are justified by lemmas 6, 7 and 8 that separately consider the situations where k ≤ φ and k > φ. Specifically, we show that, if Game k and Game k − 1' can be distinguished, there exists an anonymity adversary B 1 against the hint system. Likewise, if Game k and Game k' can be told apart, lemmas 7 and 8 show that there exists either a AI-CCA adversary B 2 or a WROB-CCA adversary B 2 against the encryption scheme. By combining these results altogether, we find
Lemma 6. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , }, Game k is indistinguishable from Game k − 1' if the tag-based hint scheme is anonymous. More precisely, we have
Proof. We show that, if an adversary A can distinguish Game k and Game k − 1', we can construct an anonymity adversary B against the tag-based anonymous hint scheme. We note that Game k and Game k − 1' are identical when k ≤ φ = |S 0 ∩ S 1 | and we thus assume k > φ. On input of common public parameters cp for the hint scheme, our adversary B initially generates a one-time key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ) and sends VK as a target tag to its challenger. The latter replies by sending public parameters (G, g) as well as two distinct tag-based hint public keys pk h 0 , pk h 1 . Then, B has to prepare a master public key BE-MPK for the ANOBE adversary A. To do this, B randomly picks two distinct indices i 0 , i 1 $ ← {1, . . . , n} and sets pk h i 0 = pk h 0 and pk h i 1 = pk h 1 . Then, our adversary B generates a set of n key pairs (sk i ,pk i ) ← π pke .Keygen(1 λ ) for the underlying public key encryption scheme. It then defines pk i 0 = (pk i 0 , pk h i 0 ) and pk i 1 = (pk i 1 , pk h i 1 ). For all indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i 0 , i 1 }, B generates (sk h i , pk h i ) ← π hint .Keygen(cp) itself and defines pk i = (pk i , pk h i ). It finally hands A the master public key consisting of BE-MPK = cp, {pk 1 , . . . , pk n }, Σ , where pk i = (pk i , pk h i ). Throughout the game, A is allowed to corrupt any user i ∈ {1, . . . , n} depending on the previously collected information. At each corruption query, B aborts if the queried index i unluckily falls into the forbidden set {i 0 , i 1 }. Otherwise, B necessarily knows the underlying secret key sk i = (sk i , sk h i ) and returns it to the ANOBE adversary A.
When the adversary A makes a decryption query, C = (VK, U, (H 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (H , C ), σ), i , for some index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, B returns ⊥ if VK = VK . Otherwise, we note that B can always answer the query on its own whenever i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 }. If i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 }, B invokes its tag-based anonymity challenger 5 up to times: for j = 1 to , it considers H j and makes verification queries (U, H j , VK) until the challenger indicates that H j = Invert(cp, sk β , VK, U ) = 1 for some j ∈ {1, . . . , } and some β ∈ {0, 1}. When the smallest such j is found, B uses the corresponding private keysk i β to decrypt C j and sends the result to A. If the challenger always replies 0 at each verification query, B simply returns ⊥ to A, meaning that user i was not a legitimate receiver of C.
In the challenge phase, A outputs messages M 0 , M 1 and two subsets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of equal size. At this point, B re-orders S 0 , S 1 as S 0 = {θ 1 , . . . , θ φ , θ φ+1 , . . . , θ }, S 1 = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ φ , ρ φ+1 , . . . , ρ } where θ j = ρ j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , φ}. If θ k = i 0 or ρ k = i 1 , the simulator B aborts. We call Good the event (θ k = i 0 ) ∧ (ρ k = i 1 ), which implies pk θ k = (pk θ k , pk h 0 ) and pk ρ k = (pk ρ k , pk h 1 ). If Good occurs, B sends its challenge request to its own challenger and receives in response a challenge hint (U , H ) = π hint .Hint(cp, VK , pk h b , r ), for some random bit b $ ← {0, 1} and some r $ ← R h . The ANOBE challenge ciphertext is produced according to the following steps.
, which is available if Good occurs occurs.
For
in the same way since it knows sk h ρ j in any occurrence of Good. 3. For j = k+1 to , B sets (H j , C j ) = π hint .Invert(cp, sk h θ j , VK , U ), π pke .Encrypt(pk θ j , M 0 ||VK ) , which is possible since sk h θ j is available for the same reason as in previous cases.
Finally, set (H
The adversary A then receives the ciphertext C = VK , U , (H τ (1) , C τ (1) ), . . . , (H τ ( ) , C τ ( ) ), σ , for some random permutation τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } and where σ is a one-time signature on the whole bundle.
In the second phase, A makes further adaptive corruption queries for indices i ∈ S 0 S 1 and B handles them as in the first phase. Also, B can still consistently answer decryption queries by appealing to its tag-based hint challenger and since it knows {sk i } n i=1 . The game ends with A outputting a bit b ∈ {0, 1} which is also B's result. If B did not abort, its anonymity advantage against the tag-based hint system is as large as the gap between A's probabilities of outputting 1 in Game k and Game k − 1'. Indeed, if B's challenger chooses b = 0, then B is playing Game k − 1' with A whereas, if b = 1, B is playing Game k.
When analyzing B's probability not to abort, we first recall that A's corruption queries cannot involve any index i in S 0 S 1 = {pk θ φ+1 , . . . , pk θ , pk ρ φ+1 , . . . , pk ρ }. Therefore, a sufficient condition for B not to be faced with an embarrassing query is to have Good occurring. The probability of this desirable event is Pr[Good] = 1/n(n − 1) > 1/n 2 . The announced bound (E.1) then follows from the bound given by (C.1).
Lemma 7.
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , φ}, Game k' is indistinguishable from Game k if the underlying encryption scheme is IND-CCA. More precisely, we have
Proof. We prove that, if the adversary A can distinguish Game k and Game k', there is a chosenciphertext adversary against the underlying public key encryption scheme. We note that, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , φ}, Game k and Game k' are identical when M 0 = M 1 and we thus assume M 0 = M 1 . This implies that the adversary cannot corrupt users in S 0 ∩ S 1 . Our IND-CCA adversary B receives a public keypk from its challenger and it has to prepare a master public key BE-MPK comprising n public keyspk 1 , . . . ,pk n for the ANOBE adversary A. To this end, B picks i $ ← {1, . . . , n} at random and definespk i =pk . Then, B generates n − 1 public key encryption key pairs (sk i ,pk i ) ← π pke .Keygen(1 λ ) itself for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i }. It finally chooses public parameters cp for the hint scheme and generates (sk h i , pk h i ) ← π hint .Keygen(cp) for i = 1 to n. The master public key BE-MPK = cp, {(pk i , pk h i )} n i=1 , Σ is given to A. At any time, A is allowed to corrupt an arbitrary user i ∈ {1, . . . , n} depending on the information it gathered so far. At each corruption query, B aborts and fails in the event that A chooses to corrupt user i . Otherwise, B is necessarily able to consistently answer the query since it knows secret keys {sk i , sk h i } i =i . When A makes a decryption query (C = (VK, U, (H 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (H , C ), σ), i), we assume that the query involves the challenge keypk since B can always run the legal decryption procedure otherwise. To simulate the decryption algorithm without knowingsk , B appeals to its own IND-CCA challenger. It first uses the i-th hint private key sk h i to compute H = π hint .Invert(cp, sk i , VK, U ). If H = H j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , }, B returns ⊥. Otherwise, B considers the smallest index j such that H = H j and sends the decryption query C j to its own challenger. If the latter's response can be parsed as M ||VK, for some M of appropriate length, B returns M to A. Otherwise, B returns ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext fails to decrypt properly.
If the event Good occurs, B chooses a one-time signature key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ) and sends the two messages (M 0 ||VK ), (M 1 ||VK ) to its IND-CCA challenger. The latter returns a challenge ciphertext C = π pke .Encrypt(pk , M b ||VK ), for some hidden random bit b ∈ R {0, 1}. The ANOBE challenge ciphertext is then generated by choosing r $ ← R h and defining ciphertext components as follows.
1. For j = 1 to k − 1, B computes (U, H j ) = π hint .Hint(cp, VK , pk h θ j , r) and sets (H j , C j ) as
2. For j = k + 1 to , B computes (U, H j ) = π hint .Hint(cp, VK , pk h θ j , r) and sets (H j , C j ) as
The adversary A then receives the ciphertext
) and for some permutation τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , }.
In the second phase, A makes further adaptive corruption queries for indices i ∈ S 0 S 1 and B handles them as in the first phase. Whenever A makes a decryption query (C, i), B parses the ciphertext C as C = (VK, U, (H 1 , C 1 ) , . . . , (H , C ), σ) and outputs ⊥ if VK = VK or if σ is invalid. Otherwise, if i = i , B can run the decryption algorithm by itself since it knows the private keỹ sk i . If i = i , B appeals to the decryption oracle it is given access to. It first uses sk h i to compute H = π hint .Invert(cp, sk h i , VK, U ) and determine which ciphertext should be decrypted among {C 1 , . . . , C }. If H ∈ {H 1 , . . . , H }, B returns ⊥. Assuming that H = H j for some j ∈ {1, . . . , }, B returns ⊥ if C j = C as, given that VK = VK , the real ANOBE decryption necessarily gives ⊥ since C decrypts to M b ||VK . Otherwise, upon receiving the challenger's response M ||VK , B returns M if VK = VK . Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
At the end of the game, A outputs b ∈ {0, 1} and B produces the same result. We claim that, if B did not abort, its IND-CCA advantage is as large as the difference between A's probabilities of outputting 0 in Game k and Game k'. Indeed, if B's challenger chooses b = 0, then B is playing Game k whereas, if b = 1, B is playing Game k'.
When it comes to evaluate B's probability not to abort, we note that, whenever M 0 = M 1 , A is not allowed to corrupt any user in S 0 ∩ S 1 = {θ 1 , . . . , θ φ }. Since θ k ∈ S 0 ∩ S 1 , a sufficient condition for B not to be asked forsk i is to have Good occurring. This is the case with probability Pr[Good] = 1/n since the index i is chosen at random independently of A's view.
Lemma 8. For each k ∈ {φ+1, . . . , }, Game k' is indistinguishable from Game k if the encryption scheme is AI-CCA secure and weakly robust. More precisely, for any ANOBE adversary distinguishing the two games, there exists either an AI-CCA adversary B or a WROB-CCA adversary B such that
Proof. We show that, if the ANOBE adversary A is able to distinguish Game k and Game k', we can either construct an AI-CCA adversary B against the public key encryption scheme or break its weak robustness property. Our AI-CCA adversary B is given as input two public keyspk 0 ,pk 1 from its AI-CCA challenger and we denote bysk 0 andsk 1 the corresponding private keys. Algorithm B has to generate a master public key BE-MPK containing n public key encryption keyspk 1 , . . . ,pk n . To do this, B randomly picks two distinct indices i 0 , i 1 $ ← {1, . . . , n} and setspk i 0 =pk 0 andpk i 1 =pk 1 . Then, B generates n − 2 key pairs (sk i ,pk i ) ← π pke .Keygen(1 λ ) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i 0 , i 1 }. Finally, B also chooses public parameters cp for the hint scheme and generates (sk h i , pk h i ) ← π hint .Keygen(cp) for i = 1 to n. The master public key consisting of cp, (pk 0 , pk h 0 ), . . . , (pk n , pk h n ), Σ is given as input to A. During the game, the adversary A is allowed to adaptively corrupt any user i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. At each corruption query, B aborts in the event that the queried i is such that i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 }. Otherwise, B necessarily knows the queried secret key (sk i , sk h i ) and returns it to A. For each decryption query (C = (VK, U, (H 1 , C 1 ) , . . . , (H , C ), σ), i) made by A, B can reply on its own whenever i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 }. If i = i 0 (resp. i = i 1 ), B uses sk h i to determine which ciphertext should be decrypted among C 1 , . . . , C . Namely, if H j = π hint .Invert(sk h i , VK, U ) for j = 1 to , B returns ⊥. If it turns out that H j = π hint .Invert(sk h i , VK, U ) for some j ∈ {1, . . . , }, B queries its own decryption oracle and asks it for the decryption of C j undersk 0 (resp.sk 1 ). In the challenge phase, A outputs messages M 0 , M 1 and subsets S 0 , S 1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of equal size . These sets are re-ordered as S 0 = {θ 1 , . . . , θ φ , θ φ+1 , . . . , θ } and S 1 = {ρ 1 , . . . , ρ φ , ρ φ+1 , . . . , ρ } where θ j = ρ j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , φ}. If θ k = i 0 or ρ k = i 1 , B aborts. We denote by Good the event
If the event Good occurs, B generates a one-time signature key pair (SK , VK ) ← G(λ) and sends the messages (M 0 ||VK , M 1 ||VK ) to its AI-CCA challenger. The latter flips a random coin b $ ← {0, 1} and returns a challenge ciphertext C = π pke .Encrypt(pk b , M b ||VK ). The adversary's challenge ciphertext is then obtained by choosing r $ ← R h and computing ciphertext components as follows.
The adversary A is then given the challenge
) and τ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , } is a random permutation. In the second phase, A makes further adaptive corruption queries for indices i ∈ S 0 S 1 and B handles them as previously. Decryption queries are also dealt with in the same way with one difference: namely, if A makes a decryption query (C = (VK, U, (H 1 , C 1 ) , . . . , (H , C ), σ), i) for which we simultaneously have i ∈ {i 0 , i 1 } and
for some j ∈ {1, . . . , }, our adversary B returns ⊥. Since VK = VK , it is easy to see that C cannot correctly decrypt to a message ending with VK under the private keysk b . Still, we have to consider the probability to have Decrypt(sk 1−b , C ) = M ||VK for some plaintext M , which would render A's view inconsistent. However, it is easy to see that B could be turned into a weak robustness (more precisely, WROB-CCA) adversary B if the latter event occurs with non-negligible probability. When A terminates, it outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs b as well. If B did not abort, its AI-CCA advantage is easily seen to be as large as the difference between A's probabilities of outputting 0 in Game k and Game k'. Indeed, if B's AI-CCA challenger sets its challenge bit as b = 0, B is playing Game k with A whereas, in the situation b = 1, B is playing Game k'.
When it comes to assess B's probability not to abort, we recall that A cannot corrupt any user in S 0 S 1 = {θ φ+1 , . . . , θ , ρ φ+1 , . . . , ρ }. Hence, a sufficient condition for the adversary A not to query the private keyssk θ k orsk ρ k is to have Good occurring. Since it does so with probability Pr[Good] = 1/n(n − 1) > 1/n 2 , the announced result follows.
We note that, if we assume that the underlying encryption scheme supports labels (like, e.g., the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem), shorter ciphertexts can be obtained by including the verification key VK in the label of each ciphertext (instead of appending it to the plaintext). In this case, the proof of lemma 8 does not have to assume that the encryption scheme is weakly robust. 
F Security Definitions for Public Key Encryption

F.2 Definitions of Robustness
This section recalls the definitions of robust public key encryption given by Abdalla, Bellare and Neven [2] .
Definition 8. [2]
A public key encryption scheme (Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) is strongly robust under chosen-ciphertext attacks (SROB-CCA) if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger generates two distinct key pairs (sk 0 , pk 0 ) ← Keygen(λ), (sk 1 , pk 1 ) ← Keygen(λ) and sends pk 0 , pk 1 to the adversary A. 2. On a polynomial number of occasions, A invokes decryption oracles O sk 0 (.), O sk 1 (.) for arbitrary ciphertexts of its choice. The adversary A wins if it manages to make a decryption query C for which O sk 0 (C) =⊥ and O sk 1 (C) =⊥.
The advantage of A is defined to be its probability of success, taken over all random coins.
For our purposes, the following weaker form of robustness suffices.
Definition 9.
[2] A public key encryption scheme (Keygen, Encrypt, Decrypt) is weakly robust under chosen-ciphertext attacks (WROB-CCA) if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in the game hereafter:
1. The challenger generates key pairs (sk 0 , pk 0 ) ← Keygen(λ), (sk 1 , pk 1 ) ← Keygen(λ) and sends public keys pk 0 , pk 1 to the adversary A. 2. The adversary A adaptively invokes decryption oracles O sk 0 (.), O sk 1 (.) for arbitrary ciphertexts. 3. Eventually, A halts and outputs a message m. Then, the challenger computes C = Encrypt(pk 0 , m) and the adversary A wins if Decrypt(sk 1 , C) =⊥.
Again, A's advantage is its success probability, taken over all random coins.
M 0 = M ||K wrob and M 1 = 0 |M | ||0 |K wrob | which it sends to its challenger and obtains a challenge ciphertext C . Using sk ID = Keyder(mpk 1 , msk 1 , ID), A decrypts C and outputs 1 if the result is not ⊥. In Game 1, the same arguments as in [2] [Theorem 4.1] show that C is statistically independent of C. Indeed, if t is a bound on A's running time, the only information about K wrob that can be carried by C is |M |. Since the adversarially-chosen M contains at most t bits of information about K wrob , Lemma D.1 of [2] implies that Pr[E 1 ] = 2 log t −k , which is negligible for a sufficiently large k. Note that, unlike [2] [Theorem 4.1], we do not have to worry about a possible correlation between ID and K wrob since ID is honestly chosen by the challenger.
G The Kurosawa-Desmedt Encryption Scheme
The following description of the KD cryptosystem [36] assumes common public parameters consisting of a group G of prime order p > 2 λ , with generators g 1 , g 2 ∈ R G. They also include the description of a universal one-way hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p , a key derivation function KDF : G → {0, 1} k , for some integer k ∈ poly(λ), a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme Π sym-enc = (E, D) of key length k Keygen(λ, cp): given common public parameters cp = (G, g 1 , g 2 , H, Π sym-enc ), choose random exponents x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 $ ← Z p and compute c = g
The public key is pk = (c, d) and the private key is sk = (x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ).
Encrypt(pk, m): to encrypt a message m ∈ G,
1. Pick r $ ← Z p and compute
The ciphertext is C = (u 1 , u 2 , e).
Decrypt(sk, C): parse the ciphertext C as (u 1 , u 2 , e). Compute α = H(u 1 , u 2 ), v = u
and K = KDF(v) ∈ {0, 1} k . Then, return m = D K (e) (which may be ⊥ if the e fails to properly decrypt under the key K).
The above algorithms describe the original Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption scheme. Following [2] , we denote by KD * the modified KD scheme where the encryption exponent r = 0 is explicitly disallowed: namely, the sender chooses r $ ← Z * p (instead of r $ ← Z p ) at encryption and the receiver outputs ⊥ upon receiving a ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e) such that u 1 = 1 G .
To prove the strong robustness of KD * , we will need a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme satisfying the following definition.
Definition 11 ([26]).
A symmetric encryption scheme (E, D) is key-binding if, for any message m, any key k and any randomness r, there exists no key k such that k = k and D k (E k (m)) =⊥.
Key-binding symmetric encryption schemes are relatively simple to construct (see [26] for example).
Theorem 6. The KD * scheme is SROB-CCA assuming that (i) KDF is a secure key derivation function and is additionally collision-resistant; (ii) the hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p is pre-image resistant; (iii) Π sym-enc is a key binding symmetric authenticated encryption scheme.
Proof. The proof uses a sequence of games where, in Game i, we denote by S i the event that the challenger outputs 1 (meaning that the adversary wins the SROB-CCA game). The sequence proceeds as follows.
Game 0: is the real strong robustness game. Namely, the challenger B chooses a prime order group G with generators g 1 , g 2 $ ← G. It also generates two public keys pk 0 = (c 0 , d 0 ) and pk 1 = (c 1 , d 1 ) , where
and sk 0 = (x 0,1 , x 0,2 , y 0,1 , y 0,2 ) and sk 1 = (x 1,1 , x 1,2 , y 1,1 , y 1,2 ) are the underlying private keys. During the game, the adversary A is allowed to simultaneously invoke both decryption oracles O sk 0 (.), O sk 1 (.) on ciphertexts of its choice. For each adversarially-generated ciphertext C = (u 1 , u 2 , e), the challenger executes the actions of O sk 0 (.) and O sk 1 (.). If either decryption gives the result ⊥, the challenger simply returns the outputs of both oracles to A. In the event that A makes a decryption query C gives O sk 0 (C) = M 0 =⊥ and O sk 1 (C) = M 1 =⊥, the challenger returns M 0 , M 1 to A, halts and outputs 1. If A terminates without any occurrence of the latter event, the challenger B outputs 0. We call S 0 the event of B outputting 1 at the end of its interaction with A.
Game 1: is identical to Game 0 with the difference that the challenger B makes uses of the discrete logarithm ω = log g 1 (g 2 ) ∈ Z p when handling decryption queries. Namely, when A comes up with a ciphertext C = (u 1 , u 2 , e), B returns (M 0 , M 1 ) = (⊥, ⊥) if u 2 = u ω 1 . Clearly, Game 1 and Game 0 are identical until, on behalf of O sk 1 (.) or O sk 2 (.), B outputs ⊥ for a ciphertext that would correctly decrypt in Game 0. If we call F 1 the latter event, we clearly have |Pr[
The same "plug and pray" argument as in [27, 3, 21] shows that event F 1 implies either a distinguisher B for the key derivation function or an adversary B against the (weak) ciphertext integrity of the symmetric encryption scheme (see section H for definitions of these properties) . Since algorithms B and B have to guess upfront which decryption query will involve the accepted invalid ciphertext, we actually have Pr[ Game 3: is identical to Game 2 but we add yet another failure event F 3 that gets the challenger B to stop and output 0. We call Suppose that algorithm B pre-img receives as input a random α ∈ Z p in the range of H with the task of finding a pre-image for it. Assuming that F 3 occurs with noticeable probability, B pre-img can prepare the two public keys pk 0 = (c 0 , d 0 ) and pk 1 = (c 1 , d 1 ) in such a way that the underlying private keys sk 0 = (x 0,1 , x 0,2 , y 0,1 , y 0,2 ), sk 1 = (x 1,1 , x 1,2 , y 1,1 , y 1,2 ) satisfy (G.2) when the target α is the left-hand-side member. This will force A to output a ciphertext (u 1 , u 2 , e) such that α = H(u 1 , u 2 ) and thereby break the pre-image resistance of H. Since B pre-img 's challenger chooses α ∈ Z p uniformly and independently of A's view, the above choice of sk 0 and sk 1 is easily seen not to affect the distribution of pk 0 and pk 1 . We can thus write for i = 0, 1. Since k 0 = k 1 unless one of the events F 2 or F 3 occurs, we cannot simultaneously have D k 0 (e) =⊥ and D k 1 (e) =⊥ as long as Π sym-enc is a key binding symmetric encryption scheme in the sense of definition 11.
We now give a proof that KD * is key-private under chosen-ciphertext attacks. The proof makes use of standard techniques along the lines of [6] [Theorem 6] and [21] . Although the result seems pretty straightforward, we have not been able to find a proof for it in the literature.
Theorem 7. The KD * scheme is AI-CCA assuming that: (i) the DDH assumption holds in G; (ii) H is a universal one-way hash function; (iii) KDF is a secure key-derivation function; (iv) Π sym-enc is a secure symmetric authenticated encryption scheme.
Proof. The proof uses a sequence of games where, in Game i, S i stands for the event that the adversary successfully guesses the challenger's bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The proof makes use of Halevi's sufficient condition for key-privacy. Namely, in the challenge phase, the adversary's chosen message M is ignored and the challenger B rather computes an encryption of a random message M . The sequence of games is very similar to the one of [21] and proceeds as follows. and sk 0 = (x 0,1 , x 0,2 , y 0,1 , y 0,2 ) and sk 1 = (x 1,1 , x 1,2 , y 1,1 , y 1,2 ) are the underlying private keys. During the game, the adversary A is allowed to invoke both decryption oracles O sk 0 (.), O sk 1 (.) on arbitrary ciphertext C of its choice. For each query C = (u 1 , u 2 , e) made to oracle O sk i (.), for i ∈ {0, 1}, the challenger runs the decryption process using sk i and hands the result of the decryption process to A. In the challenge phase, the adversary A comes up with a plaintext M . At this step, the challenger ignores M , flips a random coin b , chooses a random plaintext M , picks r $ ← Z * p and computes
where K = KDF(v ) and α = H(u 1 , u 2 ). We let C = (u 1 , u 2 , e ) be the challenge ciphertext sent to A. In the second phase, A makes further decryption queries C such that C = C and eventually outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We call S 0 the event that b = b .
Game 1: we modify the way to generate the common parameters (g 1 , g 2 ), the public keys pk 0 , pk 1 and the challenge ciphertext. Namely, the challenger B picks random values x, y ∈ Z * p , w 0 , w 1 $ ← Z p such that w 0 + x · w 1 = 0 and defines X = g x 1 , Y = g Decryption queries are handled using sk 0 and sk 1 as in Game 0.
In the challenge phase, the challenger flips a coin b hash function.
Game 5: in this game, the simulator B makes explicit use of the value y = log g 1 (g 2 ) ∈ Z * p , which can henceforth be used since we are done with the DDH assumption. In this game, B rejects all decryption queries C = (u 1 , u 2 , e) such that u 2 = u For simplicity, we assume b = 0 (the case b = 1 can be handled in a completely similar way) and consider the probability that an invalid ciphertext (C = (ũ 1 ,ũ 2 ,ẽ) = (g r 1 , g r 2 ,ẽ)) (namely, with r = r ) be accepted by O sk 1 (.). When such a decryption query is processed, the challenger B computesα = H(ũ 1 ,ũ 2 ) andṽ =ũ and attempts to decryptẽ using the symmetric keyK = KDF(ṽ). The same "plug and pray" argument as in [21] show that the symmetric decryption must fail unless A was able to break either the security of KDF or to forge a valid symmetric encryption for Π sym-enc on a random-looking keyK.
Indeed, if we consider what A knows about sk 0 = (x 0,1 , x 0,2 , y 0,1 , y 0,2 ), sk 1 = (x 1,1 , x 1,2 , y 1,1 , y 1,2 ) and about the value log g 1 (ṽ) = r·(x 1,1 +α·y 1,1 )+y·r ·(x 1,2 +α·y 1,2 ), we observe that pk 0 reveals the right-hand-side member of the first two equations in the linear system (G.5). The challenge ciphertext is of the form C = (g x 1 , g x 2 , e ), where x, x ∈ R Z * p and e = KDF g x·(x 0,1 +α y 0,1 )+x ·y·(x 0,2 +α y 0,2 ) 1 , which potentially leaks the right-hand-side member of the third equation. The fourth and fifth equations correspond to the information revealed by pk 1 but we easily check that A has no information about the RHS member of the last equation. Indeed, as long as r = r , the matrix in (G.5) is easily seen to be of full rank. Since the last row is linearly independent of other rows, log g 1 (ṽ) is independent of A's view. So, the only way for A to create a ciphertext that is rejected in Game 5 but would not have been in Game 4 is to imply a KDF-distinguisher B or an algorithm B forging a symmetric authenticated encryption: we can write where α 0 = H(u 0,1 , u 0,2 ) and α 1 = H(u 1,1 , u 1,2 ). It is easy to see that the distributions of v 0 and v 1 are statistically indistinguishable from A's view since, given that all invalid ciphertexts are rejected by both oracles, A has no information about (x 0,2 , y 0,2 , x 1,2 , y 1,2 ) whatsoever.
Finally, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 10. The KD * scheme is key-less reproducible.
Proof. The proof is quite simple and it is similar to the proof of standard reproducibility (given in [8, 7] ) for the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem. For any public parameters par = (G, g 1 , g 2 , H), any given public key pk = (c, d) = (g 2 ) and any ciphertext C = (u 1 , u 2 , e) = (g r 1 , g r 2 , E K (m)), with K = KDF (c · d α ) r and α = H(u 1 , u 2 ), the reproducibility algorithm R proceeds as follows. ∈ G and K = KDF(v ). Compute e = E K (m ) and return (u 1 , u 2 , e ).
It is straightforward that this algorithm satisfies the definition of key-less reproducibility.
H Definitions for Authenticated Encryption Schemes and Key Derivation
Functions
